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HOUSING THE BLACK POPULATION: TRENDS IN THE '70s.

BLACK POPULATION SETTLEMENT PATTERNS: TRENDS OF THE '70s.

WHERE BLACKS LIVE: TRENDS OF THE '70s.

*published as book?*

~~BLACK URBAN SETTLEMENT PATTERNS: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS~~ ✓

BY

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Americans are mobile people. Every year about 20 percent of the population moves its domicile within the same locality or somewhere else. In recent years, there has been a substantial migration from city to suburbs, from the eastern and northern part of the nation to the "sunbelt", and from older to newer cities.

Like the rest of the nation, blacks, too, are mobile. Between 1940 and 1970, there was a major shift in the black population from the south to the north and into the central cities, while whites in large numbers were moving to the suburbs.

Will blacks continue the settlement patterns of those two decades -- will they continue to move as they have done and will there be, in the next few years, a black penetration of the suburbs? It is now apparent that most blacks will continue to live in large city ghettos for the rest of this century. These ghettos will continue to expand and, in predictable instances, they will engulf their cities. At the same time, there will be increasing numbers of blacks moving to inner, and older, suburbs and a few with relatively high incomes who will move out of center city enclaves that are predominantly black into enclaves in the suburbs that are predominantly white.

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These assessments are based on the assumption that there will be no significant change in the current distribution of income among races <sup>1/</sup> nor serious diminution of ~~white racism~~ <sup>discrimination</sup> as it is now practiced by institutions and individuals.

Present and projected patterns for income, jobs, and housing do not reflect a fair and open market and give little reason to expect radical changes, although some modest progress may be made. In the housing sector, for example, housing legislation for more than a quarter century has committed this nation to a policy of providing every family with a decent home in a suitable environment, but we are a long way from meeting that commitment for most black families. Despite some advances in their overall housing conditions, many blacks still live in housing which is structurally deficient, too small for family needs, too costly for the family in terms of the kind of shelter it provides, or situated in decaying neighborhoods. There are few indications that this situation will change much in the foreseeable future.

The year 1970 marked a turning point in black settlement patterns and in the impetus for social change that opened up residential opportunities for blacks. This was the end of a decade when the struggle for civil rights was at its peak and when governmental and private action was mobilized against discrimination in education, housing, voting rights, and employment.

By 1970, these social changes had come to an end or were neutralized. "Benign neglect" had displaced much of the active concern in the sixties over the status of minorities and the poor in all sectors of our national life. Federal funding of categorical programs in the cities was being replaced with revenue sharing and there was a lessening of federal directives and new emphasis on local government decision-making. There also was good



reason for concern that national policy was moving toward retreat on efforts to open up our society to blacks.

But in the 1960s, there was great optimism that the society was undergoing profound change. It was a period of modest gains, high expectations, and growing racial awareness, black pride, and militancy. It was also a decade that saw more than a million blacks move from rural areas and small southern towns to large northern cities, where they hoped to share in the fruits of an expanding economy.

The mobility of the black population was in response to the changes that blacks perceived in our society -- the expansion of job opportunities in the north, the urbanization of the south, the rising expectations that racial equality might be realized, and the rapid development of suburban areas for whites which opened new residential opportunities for blacks inside northern cities. Almost 1.5 million blacks left the South during the 1960s. The percentage of the black population that lived in the South declined from 60% in 1960 (it had been 68% in 1950) to 53% by 1970. Consequently, almost 40% of all blacks living in the North in 1970 had been <sup>2/</sup> born in the South.

By 1970, blacks also had made a massive shift from rural to urban areas. Those living within metropolitan areas increased by 31.6% between 1960 and 1970. Most of this shift was into central cities. Blacks increased as a percent of central city populations from 16.4% to 20.5% from 1960 to 1970. For central cities whose metropolitan areas had a population of one million or more, the percent of blacks increased from 18.8% to 25.2% <sup>3/</sup> from 1960 to 1970.

One gets a better idea of the dimension of these changes from the fact that 43% of the U.S. black population is now concentrated in 26 cities that each have more than 100,000 blacks. <sup>4/</sup> While these cities are located in all



parts of the country, most of them are outside the South and in areas where a pattern of black concentration began in 1950s. These cities received the largest migration from the South during the 1960s. By 1970, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Ga., and Newark, N.J. had black majorities and four other cities -- Baltimore, Detroit, New Orleans, and St. Louis -- were more than 40% black.

There was another great change in the shifting populations -- by 1970, blacks became more urban than whites. The percentage of blacks living in an urban setting (in SMSAs -- Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) was 74%, while 68% of whites lived in these areas (see Table 1). Most of the blacks were concentrated in the central city, while a growing majority of urban whites lived in suburbs. In other words, the trend has been one of increasing concentration of the black population in the inner core of metropolitan areas. The percentage increase in the proportion of blacks in the inner city in the early 1970s has been increasing at about 1% a year, and the percentage of the black population in rural areas has been showing a comparable decline of about 1% a year.<sup>5/</sup> But it was not by their moves alone that blacks became a larger proportion of the central city population; it was also because whites have continued to leave the central cities. (It appears from this data that while whites have ceased to concentrate and even show some small deconcentration, blacks are continuing to concentrate both in center cities and within the largest metropolitan areas as a whole.<sup>6/</sup>

To fully understand the significance of these changes, however, it is necessary to get a more fine-grained view of the distribution of blacks within metropolitan areas in relation to the distribution of economic power and resources. The outstanding feature of the central city in the last two decades has been the structural change in the function of the city compared to other parts of the metropolitan area. As suburbs developed, the city was forced to give up its domination of the metropolis. The suburbs captured



jobs in the central city and generated new jobs in the suburbs as well. Over the years, the process gathered momentum to the point where suburbs began to dominate the metropolis, state legislatures, and regional decision-making bodies.<sup>7/</sup>

The out-migration of whites from the central city did open up some opportunities in the city for blacks. The soft market for housing in the city allowed blacks to make marginal improvements in the quality of their housing. Blacks filled in the neighborhoods that whites had left and many of the former black neighborhoods were then taken over by new immigrants (Puerto Ricans or blacks from the South . When this was not the case, neighborhoods fell into abandonment.) In 1960, 62% of black families had some kind of housing problem, compared to 29% for all households; by 1970, the black percentage had fallen to 54% -- still a high number and more than twice the 21% of the entire population which experienced some housing problems.<sup>8/</sup>

Not all blacks, however, flowed into the central city. More than 800,000 joined the 2.7 million blacks who were already in suburbia, many of them in traditional black population pockets. The percentage of the black metropolitan population living in the suburbs increased from 11% in 1960 to 16% in 1970. The suburbanization of blacks was limited to the largest metropolitan areas, with most of this movement occurring in less than a dozen of these areas (see Table 2). In suburban neighborhoods in 1970, 40% of the blacks were in neighborhoods where the majority of persons were black while only 29% of the blacks were in neighborhoods which were 15% black or less. In all metropolitan areas where there has been substantial black suburbanization, blacks have moved into only a fraction of the suburban neighborhoods. Even more significantly, they have settled in the oldest suburban areas, or those nearest to black inner-city ghettos.



What emerges most clearly from this background on black suburbanization is that during the sixties when there were major population shifts in the U.S., when blacks were an ascendant group making modest strides as a result of the civil rights movement, the best opportunity was at hand for the markets and institutions that affect population settlement to work fairly. The experience of the 1960s is, perhaps, the best measure we have of what could occur given the presence or absence of such factors. In the sections below we want to look more closely at the dynamics of black population mobility and other current factors which affect the location of black households and appear to be causing the increasing concentration of blacks.

Blacks choose their place of residence for reasons that do not differ essentially from those of whites.<sup>9/</sup> The answers produced by the classic study of "Why Families Move"<sup>10/</sup> are applicable to both races. Intersectional moves, such as those from South to North, almost always are in pursuit of a higher standard of living and, above all, improved employment opportunities. Movement within the same urban area also is largely influenced by job location, though other factors, such as neighborhood environment, quality schools, better air, and the like, are important considerations in the decision-making process.<sup>11/</sup>

Although sharing with whites the same criteria for deciding where to live, blacks obviously locate in a pattern distinctly different from that of whites. The effort to explain this phenomenon engenders sharp controversy both among social scientists and the general public. At issue is the weight to be given to the average black's lesser resources to compete with whites in the housing market as compared to the weight, if any, to be given to race-related factors. In short, is the explanation economic or racial? If both, what is the ratio of these two determinants? How does one isolate and measure economic factors or racial factors? Can they, in fact, be



quantified? If so, are there useful data available?

The answer to these questions are exceedingly germane to an effort to project the likely future distribution of blacks. We find it necessary, therefore, to identify and measure both economic and racial constraints in order to assess their future viability in affecting blacks' ability to exercise their preferences in housing.

The economic condition of blacks improved, both absolutely and relatively compared to whites, during the years of 1960 to 1970. Although the median annual income of black families in 1969 was only 61% of that of white families (\$5,999 and \$9,794 respectively), this marked a significant advance over 1959, when it was only 52%.<sup>12/</sup>

This income gain was accompanied by significant changes in the occupational distribution of blacks. Blacks in professional and technical occupations nearly doubled between 1960 and 1970, rising from 4.8% to 9.1%, compared to an increase for whites in these occupations from 12.1% to 14.8%.<sup>13/</sup> Blacks working as managers, officials, and proprietors increased from 2.6% to 3.5% among all such workers, compared to a small percentage decrease for whites. Blacks in clerical jobs increased from 7.3% to 13.2% of all such workers, while whites increased only from 15.7% to 18%. For blacks who got jobs in occupational categories that suggest upward mobility, the percentage increase was great: in the professional and technical category, it was an increase of 131%; among managers, officials and proprietors, it was 67% increase; for clerical, 121% increase; for sales, a 77% increase; for craft workers and foremen and women, a 67% increase; for operatives, a 42% increase; and for service workers (other than domestics), a 27% increase. In contrast, declining percentages were registered for such lower-paid occupations as private household workers, down by 34%; nonfarm laborers, down by 9%; and farmers and farm workers, down by 61%.



The slight lessening of the income gap between the races did not reflect equal gains at all income levels in the black population. The gains were largely concentrated at the top, as indicated by the steeper percentage increases in the better paid occupations. This also is reflected in the 13% of black families with incomes over \$15,000 in 1969 as compared to only 2% in 1959. Compared to this sixfold increase for blacks, white families in this income category had only little more than a threefold gain.<sup>14/</sup>

The rise in incomes of blacks between 1960 and 1970 resulted in some marked improvement in the housing they occupied. Black occupied dwelling units lacking some or all plumbing facilities decreased from 41% of all black occupied units in 1960 to 17% in 1970. Within central cities, the drop was from 21% in 1960 to 5% in 1970.<sup>15/</sup>

Black homeownership also increased during the 1960s. In 1970, 42% of all black occupied dwelling units were owner occupied, compared to 38% in 1960. A 4% increase also was recorded for black ownership within central cities. Significantly, black ownership in suburbs increased only 2% during that decade.<sup>16/</sup> But blacks paid dearly to own their homes. In 1970, a higher percentage of family income was paid by black homeowners than was paid by whites for housing. The median percentage of income paid by black homeowners was 18% compared to 16% for whites. Some 30% of black homeowners paid 25% of their income or more for housing compared to only 18% of white homeowners. A similar pattern prevailed for renters. Some 43% of black renters, compared to 35% of white renters, paid 25% or more of their income for rent.<sup>17/</sup>

The data establish that between 1960 and 1970 these changes occurred; black income increased in relationship to white income; blacks moved upward occupationally in significant numbers, although the sharpest increases were in occupations with the highest educational and skill requirements; blacks



made marked improvements in both the quality of the housing they occupied and in increased homeownership; and blacks were prepared to pay a higher proportion of their income than were whites for housing that they wanted.

While many of the shifts in the nationwide distribution of black households from 1960 to 1970 can be attributed to improved occupational opportunities and to increased income, this is not to say that increased income has permitted blacks to live wherever they could afford to buy or rent homes. This would be true only if blacks did, in fact, live wherever they could afford to live. In the great moves of the sixties, did blacks take advantage of housing opportunities outside the ghettos to the limit of their economic resources? The question has been thoroughly examined and the answer is a decisive "no," based on conclusive evidence from the study<sup>18/</sup> by Hermalin and Farley of black underrepresentation in the suburbs. The authors used 1970 Census data to compute the percent of blacks and whites within various income categories living in central cities and suburbs. They found that if blacks were distributed according to income, several times as many blacks would live in the suburbs and many fewer would live in central cities. In the Los Angeles, Houston, Seattle, San Diego, Kansas City, Indianapolis, San Jose, Portland, Providence, and Washington, D.C. metropolitan areas, over 55% of the blacks would have been living in the suburbs if distributed on the basis of income comparable to that of whites in the suburbs. Instead, only 17% of the blacks lived in these suburbs according to the 1970 Census.

The authors also analyzed the city/suburb distribution by race on the basis of what each race paid for housing in 1970. By this gauge, a far higher percentage of blacks would have been living in the suburbs if the population had been distributed according to amounts actually being paid for housing. The proportion of blacks living in suburbs of the nation's



29 largest cities would have been 43 percent rather than 16 percent, and much closer to the 57 percent of whites who lived in these suburbs.

A look at the overall distribution of races by income and place of residence in metropolitan areas leads to two inescapable conclusions: that lesser income, and consequent reduced ability to pay for housing, accounts for some of the difference in residential patterns of the races, but the difference between the 43% of blacks who could afford to live in the suburbs and the 16% who actually lived there in 1970 is a strong indication of non-economic causes. Hermalin and Farley came to a similar conclusion. They said that, "evidence strongly indicates that residential segregation in central cities in 1970 is far in excess of what would be expected on economic grounds alone." This confirms similar findings by Taeuber and <sup>19/</sup> Taeuber in their classic 1965 study based on the 1960 Census.

Since economic factors only partially account for the distribution of blacks in our metropolitan areas, it is necessary to identify the non-economic causes of their distribution. There can only be two non-economic causes: the desire of blacks to live in black population concentrations, or the prevention of blacks from living where they want to live and can afford to live by discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of housing.

Opinion polls show that the blacks who choose to live in all-black neighborhoods is between 8 to 13% of those polled; the rest prefer an inter-racial environment. Depending on how the question is phrased, varying proportions of blacks express preferences for racial ratios in acceptable neighborhoods from "mostly black" to "makes no difference," with the largest number preferring a 50% black, 50% white neighborhood. <sup>20/</sup> So, it clearly is not a black desire for separatism that creates a balkanization of races, but instead it is discriminatory practices which prevent blacks from realizing their preferences. An examination of these practices and an assessment of



their continuing viability is essential to projecting the future distribution of blacks.

Discrimination against members of a race is based on attitudes and beliefs of the discriminators that vary in intensity and in motivation. Relatively mild personal aversions to members of another race result in proportionately limited discriminatory practices as well as limits in the lengths to which the discriminators are prepared to go. But the same person who has a benign attitude that results in non-discrimination or limited discriminatory practices under certain circumstances also may express hostile attitudes that result in extreme practices under other circumstances. Thus, the white person who accepts blacks as fellow-workers on the job might fiercely resist having them as neighbors. The white person who is at ease with blacks as social equals might take discriminatory actions against blacks if convinced that they pose an economic threat, such as lowering the value of property he or she owns.

Among the discriminatory attitudes of whites toward blacks that are most likely to lead to hostile practices, those that relate to residential proximity probably are the most volatile. Within the value system of a racist society, residential equality of the races poses for whites a threat which touches upon almost everything that they have striven to achieve in life. If they are homeowners, they see a threat to their investment, almost always the major part of their assets. Residential equality also involves the unspoken and ultimate fear of whites that the social equality conferred upon blacks by acceptance of them as neighbors undermines taboos against interracial sexual attraction and marriage. The racial imagery of whites that results from such fears is as pervasive as it is perverse. Hardly an institution of society remains uninfected or free of its distortions.



Because white attitudes are so volatile with regard to residence, those institutions that relate to the buying or renting of residential property are deeply permeated with racial consciousness, are intensely aware of the racial implications of their operations, and are practiced in the art of "neutral" subterfuge for covert actions. The result has been the gradual development of an institutionalized racism in the form of an intricate network of "standard" procedures that have a consistent racial effect. This network operates through a web of relationships in which an assumed mutual acceptance of common values and objectives either dispenses with the need to articulate racial motivations or communicates them through code words that are thoroughly understood by all participants. Persons in the housing and real estate industry who deviate from accepted institutional norms do so with an awareness of the penalties they may suffer at the hands of their trade and professional peers. Institutional racism in the housing market consequently is a hardy plant that defies uprooting. Though its branches have been pruned in recent years, they keep reappearing in new forms.

The real estate industry, self-appointed gatekeepers to the supply of housing, has long been organized along racial lines, with a dual racial market as its most flagrant characteristic. The introduction into a neighborhood of a person of another race was once listed as grounds for disciplinary <sup>21/</sup> action by the rules governing the National Association of Realtors.

Though such objectives are no longer avowed, the belief and value systems that gave rise to them have not changed much.

Real estate brokers have always considered it part of their professional role to guide buyers and tenants into settings in which they are likely to be compatible with their new neighbors. In matching homeseeker and social environment, brokers have taken great satisfaction in successful



social engineering that contributed to human happiness. The key to neighborly compatibility, in the broker's lexicon, was similarity. Real estate advertisements once featured the sales theme of "live among people of your own kind." At that time, this was not an emphasis on racial homogeneity, since this form of homogeneity was assumed and readers could not have imagined things being otherwise. "Your own kind" referred mainly to income, occupation, and life style. By implication, finding the right neighborhood and your own kind was not likely to happen unless the broker "steered" the homeseeker to locational happiness.

From its status as a much-vaunted professional skill of brokers, "steering" has been made an illicit practice by fair housing laws and can now be perpetrated by brokers only clandestinely and by using maximum efforts to cover their tracks. However, it is still an instinctive, standard operating procedure for all but a conscientious minority of white brokers to steer blacks to neighborhoods that already have black residents or to steer them to a black broker with listings in the ghetto. Whites, in turn, are steered away from neighborhoods containing blacks.

Given the few, small areas of interracial residence in most housing market areas, the practice of steering blacks into such areas and whites away from them results in a steady rise in black occupancy because every vacancy is filled by another black household. This process is accelerated when brokers, including those who are black, resort to "blockbusting." This is an intensive canvassing of white homeowners by brokers to obtain the listing of their property for sale by spreading rumors of an impending large-scale influx of black households, wholesale white flight, and a resulting glut of homes on the market which will cause prices to tumble. "Steering," with or without blockbusting, results ultimately in the formation and maintenance of ghettos.



The extent to which the residential concentration of blacks is the result of self-segregation also is a product of white racism. There is both an historic and contemporary basis for black fears of the possible consequences of moving into a white neighborhood. Blacks may fear that they will be exposed to snubs and aloofness of white neighbors or to crosses burned on the lawn, rocks thrown through windows, or arson and bombing. In addition, some blacks shun neighborly contact with whites for reasons of black pride, mixed with contempt for a race capable of practicing discrimination, oppression, and exploitation against people simply because they belong to another race. ~~These blacks think the progress of their race depends upon development of separate black institutions, including black communities and housing.~~

What is the continuing viability of the economic and non-economic constraints that have shaped the distribution of the black population -- are they likely to determine the future distribution of the races much in the same way that they have done in the past? Recent trends affecting constraints upon the ability of blacks to live in the area of their choice show little evidence of significant national change that is likely to produce a markedly different distribution pattern from that of the past ten years.

Economic constraints affecting black residential choice have tightened since 1970 and there has been a reversal of the upward trend in blacks' median income during the 1960s due to deepening unemployment and declining real wages as a result of the inflationary rise in the cost of living. The median income of all black families dropped from 61% of white family income in 1969 to 58% in 1973. During the same period, however, the median income of black families with a male head and a wife gainfully employed increased 1% as a percent of the median income of white families in a similar situation (from 77% of the white median income in 1970 to 78% in 1973). <sup>22/</sup>



There also has been a growing disparity in incomes between the upper and lower brackets of black households. This is shown by the increase of those earning under \$7,000 a year (from 43% of all black households in 1970 to 45% in 1973), compared to black households earning over \$15,000 a year (this group increased from 18% of all black households in 1970 to 19% in 1974).<sup>23/</sup>

As unemployment spread after 1970, it disproportionately affected blacks, who consistently had double the overall unemployment rate. Thus, when the overall rate stood at 8% in 1975, the rate topped 15% for blacks. Unemployment among non-white youth climbed from 29.1% in 1970 to 31.4% in 1973 and was estimated at 40% in 1975. Unemployment for white youth was less than one half the rate for black youth in these years.<sup>24/</sup>

Employment for blacks is not likely to improve unless overall employment improves and it is even questionable whether most blacks will be able to resume making advances once the cyclical recession has ended. Lost footholds may not be regained in the face of long-range factors affecting the U.S. economy, such as increased energy costs, environmental costs, and structural changes in employment.

A considerable body of expert opinion holds that the rate of economic growth in the United States is levelling off to a lower plateau for the foreseeable future. Administration economists see no significant decline in current unemployment rates through most of the remaining 1970s. For blacks who were kept out of the mainstream by illegal discrimination during periods of our history when the stream of prosperity was at floodtide, it is ironic that illegal barriers are slowly but surely being reduced at a time when the economic stream is at ebbtide and threatens not to recover.



Steeply rising unemployment and declining real wages for blacks were accompanied by sharply rising housing costs as housing starts plunged downward in 1973 and continued down through 1975, causing vacancy rates to shrink during a period of an increasing rate of family formation. Meanwhile, the cost of construction materials, labor, and mortgage interest rates continued to mount, pushing up the average cost of newly constructed dwelling units in the Northeast more than 40% between 1970 and 1975.

The federal government's housing subsidy programs for low and moderate income families were abruptly terminated early in 1973, bringing the flow of subsidized units into the market to a virtual halt the next year. These programs, operating under the Housing Act of 1968, have been particularly important to minority households. Though blacks constituted only 11% of the U.S. population in 1970, they accounted for 19.8% of all Section 235 (mortgage subsidy) houses purchased; for 22.9% of Section 236 (multi-family mortgage subsidy) rental units occupied; and for 40% of all units receiving rent supplement payments. Housing assistance programs inaugurated by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, principally Section 8 (a form of rent subsidy), are lagging badly and there is no indication that they will provide enough dwelling units to appreciably increase the housing opportunities of blacks, especially outside areas of racial concentration.

The legal attack upon discrimination in housing gathered momentum in the years immediately after World War II and, in 1950, took the form of a national coordinated campaign with the founding of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing.<sup>25/</sup> State laws against discrimination in housing were enacted beginning in the early 1950s and there were more than a score of these by the middle of the 1960s, when the fight for civil rights reached its peak and made possible the passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).<sup>26/</sup>



The passage of laws against discrimination in housing has, beyond any doubt, increased housing opportunities for blacks. Measurement of the increased opportunities resulting from these laws has not yet been made, assuming such measurement is possible. Some of the variables that remain unknown are: the quantitative and qualitative effectiveness of enforcement of fair housing laws; the extent to which racial minorities know about their rights under fair housing laws; an awareness by persons who are likely to discriminate of the specific provisions of fair housing laws and their possible penalties; and the integration potential of a given housing market area, measured in terms of blacks' reticence/responsiveness quotient and whites' tolerance/intolerance quotient.

In a classification of 44 housing market areas by characteristics indicative of both minorities' reticence/responsiveness and whites' tolerance/intolerance, it was found that on a weighted point system the housing markets were indexed from a high of 30 to a low of 13.<sup>27/</sup> Based on these findings, we assume that federal and state fair housing laws will result in a much greater reduction of non-economic constraints in such housing market areas as Washington, D.C., Los Angeles; Oxnard-Ventura, Calif.; Springfield, Mass.; Springfield, Ohio; and Providence and Brockton, Mass., than these laws will exert in such areas as Hunt County, Texas; Savannah; Macon; Rochester; or Dallas.

Title VIII requires the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to act affirmatively in carrying out the purposes of the Civil Rights Act. Usually, this is interpreted to mean going beyond measures to prevent discrimination against a person of a minority race who has undertaken to buy or rent housing. "Going beyond" mere prevention of discrimination requires the establishment of goals for minority occupancy in communities throughout each metropolitan area in order to overcome the effects of past discrimination. The planned allocation of subsidized housing for an entire



housing market area, often referred to as a "fair share plan," is a major component of such affirmative action. Supplemented by an affirmative marketing plan, which establishes minority racial occupancy targets and devises systematic advertising and selling procedures to attract minority homeseekers housing allocation plans can and are opening residential opportunities for blacks in areas long considered closed to them by virtue of economic and racial constraints.<sup>28/</sup>

The real estate industry is making slow but steady progress in adapting itself to the existence of fair housing laws. The recently concluded fair marketing agreement between HUD and the National Association of Realtors, even if largely limited to an agreement to observe fair housing laws, marks a milestone in the transformation of the "gatekeepers". This formal document, reluctantly accepted by NAR, offers good possibilities for further positive evolution favorably affecting the "steering" practices of brokers.<sup>29/</sup> Real estate licensing boards in a number of states also have proven effective in alerting brokers to fair housing law observance and have made them exceedingly conscious of the possible suspension or loss of license that will result from violations. Those brokers who in the past have chaffed under the irrationality of doing business in a dual racial market find fair housing laws a powerful public rationale for doing what they have always believed to be morally right and a protection against those of their discriminating peers who otherwise might penalize them.

Over the past 25 years, litigation on behalf of the rights of racial minorities to equal opportunity in housing has laboriously constructed a substantial body of case law that interprets federal and state constitutions and statutes to give increased protection against discrimination.<sup>30/</sup> Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, seem to have exhausted their forward momentum in this area and setbacks have outnumbered advances since 1971.



A number of state court systems, however, have acted against exclusionary zoning by suburbs, even if only on the basis of equality of access without regard to income, and only indirectly affecting equal access with regard to race.<sup>31/</sup> In a recent federal court decision, however, "redlining" -- the practice by financial institutions of denying mortgages on properties in inner city and interracial neighborhoods -- has been declared a violation of federal law by a federal district court in Cincinnati, marking a break in the civil rights losing streak in federal courts.

The authority of suburban governments to exclude housing within the means of low and moderate income households, and indirectly to exclude racial minorities, is increasingly threatened by trends toward regional decision-making. Most metropolitan areas now have regional councils of government and regional planning agencies which, though largely advisory, establish regional norms and standards by which suburban "home rule" measures can be judged. Embattled and financially drained central cities look toward regional solutions to pass part of the urban burden onto their suburbs, which have been happy to indulge in the advantages of urban life without paying their share of the costs.

Hartford, Conn., sued its suburbs and HUD for allocating community development block grant funds to the suburban jurisdictions in the absence of a housing assistance plan that meets the statutory requirements of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. A federal district court recently decided in favor of Hartford and permanently enjoined the federal funds until the suburbs assume their share of housing for low and moderate income households.

The concentration of blacks we have described is not without its political, economic, and social consequences. As the Taeubers have demon-



strated, however, even when blacks are concentrated in large cities, as is currently the trend, the number of such cities in which they could have a majority is limited because a black population of only 24 million people is simply too small. Thus, the fear of black takeover of all large cities is unwarranted.

Furthermore, it is questionable that being an overwhelming majority in cities is advantageous to black political success, as some blacks believe. A large majority is simply not required for the growth and exercise of black political power. Certainly, it helps to have a large number and in some cases, a majority of blacks in a city is necessary to assure that blacks will be elected to office. The fact is, however, that most of the small and medium-size cities with black mayors have a minority black population, and most black mayors of cities (as opposed to small towns) could not be elected to these positions without white support. In 1974, there were 26 cities of at least 25,000 people that had black mayors. Most of them, had a minority black electorate (Table 3). For example, blacks accounted for only 3 percent of the potential voters in College Park, Md.; less than 1 percent in Boulder, Colo.; and less than 10 percent in Chapel Hill, N.C., and in Grand Rapids, Mich. In 13 of the 26 cities, blacks account for less than 25 percent of the electorate. Hence, a black majority might provide greater support -- but is not a necessary condition -- for blacks to rise to the mayoralty of our cities. There is, therefore, a legitimate question as to whether high concentration works to the political advantage of blacks.

The concentration of black voting power may be at the cost of distributing that power over a wider area. There are no accurate guidelines on the critical mass of blacks needed to assure victory in political races.



Data from the Joint Center for Political Studies, for example, show several jurisdictions with a population that is at least 50 percent black that have no black elected officials.

Potentially, there are many cities that conceivably could generate a significant amount of black political power simply by virtue of the sizable percentage of the black voting age population in those cities. If blacks were elected mayors in those cities, their ability to increase job opportunities, housing, and other advantages for people at the bottom of the income scale, would be limited in half of the cities with large numbers of black voters because they have a commissioner or a council manager form of government (see Table 4). In these forms of government, the power that any one voter wields through the election of a mayor is diffused in comparison to the strong mayor form of city government.

School enrollments are inevitably overwhelmingly black, even if racially balanced, in cities that have predominantly black populations. In view of the U.S. Supreme Court's negative view on cross district, essentially city/suburban, busing, the burden remains on central city school systems. Blacks serving on Boards of Education or as school officials in such cities are confronted with insoluble problems, exacerbated by shrinking revenues.

Further, the concentration of blacks has a damaging effect on the employment opportunities of the black population. High concentrations of blacks in common labor markets intensifies competition of blacks for the job opportunities for which they qualify, worsened by the persistence of discrimination in hiring which limits the percentage of blacks in establishments and even departments for all employment but the lowest paying jobs. Blacks also are concentrated in those states, labor markets, and cities that, with the exception of Washington, D.C., have been subject to high unemployment.



Though it is likely that urban blacks will continue to be concentrated in central cities, there will be continuing changes in the areas of the city they will occupy. The geographically distinct areas which are poor "black", "middle class black", and "poor white", and "middle class white" are likely to be resuffled by the coming energy crisis, the rising cost of development outside the city, the preference of many young whites for inner-city locations and proximity to jobs and cultural activities and the increased value of inner-city real estate as long range investment. As a result, in a number of cities, areas which were traditionally black now are undergoing white resettlement and blacks are being displaced. The entry of whites into the inner city, bringing a higher tax base and prospects of interracial neighborhoods, increases the hope that the cities will be revitalized. But it also presents an equity problem. What will be done for blacks who are being displaced? Since this problem was never adequately resolved in the 1960s through urban renewal, and since there are no major and consistent efforts to deal with it now, we can only assume that there will be further concentration within the racial ghettos that now exist.

What is the outlook for the suburbs in terms of black population settlement? In dealing with this question, it is necessary to distinguish two types of suburbs. First, there are the newer and growing outer suburban areas where development of both housing and job opportunity is proceeding apace. Then there are the older, inner suburbs and suburban cities.

The outer suburbs will continue to grow both by natural increases, and by immigration from the central city and other metropolitan areas.<sup>32/</sup> This growth will be heavily influenced by transportation developments and by the improvements in infrastructure, and will occur increasingly for higher income households.<sup>33/</sup> If present trends continue, much of the suburban development will be high cost housing as a consequence of exclusionary zoning



restrictions designed to have that result with lower cost housing being forced into sectors of existing higher densities. Suburban areas are not likely to take responsibility, on their initiative, to provide opportunities for blacks, especially those with low or moderate incomes. The increased power which suburbs wield in state legislatures and in regional decision-making and planning bodies will be used to assure that their interests -- fiscal, political, and sometimes racial -- are protected and advanced.

Given this suburban scenario, without major changes in the level of black effective economic demand, blacks will not have much access to these new and growing areas. This would be true even with modest increases in the number of low and moderate income units that might be built in the suburbs, because most of those units are likely to go to needy white families already in the suburbs. The few such units that would go to blacks from the inner city are not likely to be supported by the services and social networks upon which they are dependent in cities.<sup>34/</sup> There will be some middle class blacks in outer suburbs, but their numbers will increase only relative to the rise in income of the topmost income brackets.

The older suburban areas face a different situation. Many of them are experiencing problems much like those of the inner city. An older population, aging housing stock, rising taxes and fiscal burdens, a decreasing share of jobs, a decline in the number of new jobs, and difficulty in attracting new middle-class residents. Unlike the outer suburbs, they have growing welfare caseloads, increasing unemployment, and high vacancy rates in housing.<sup>35/</sup> None of these problems, however, are as severe in the old suburbs as the problems of the center city, nor do they seem so intractable. The danger to the older suburbs is that their problems will rapidly worsen as the disinvestment psychology sets in. The hope for the older suburbs is that mixed



use, mixed race, and mixed class living is possible with a much smaller need for public investment, new development or policy intervention than is needed to restore the inner city to this healthy life style. The older suburbs have a need for people and they have features (locations, topography, amenities and institutions) which often make them desirable places to live if buyers were assured of the continued viability of their investment in these communities. Blacks will increasingly move into these older close-in suburban areas, a continuation of a process begun in the 1960s. The housing is moderately priced, they are close to city jobs, and they are near supportive services and family and social networks.

Both the old and new suburban areas, in the absence of general purpose metropolitan government, are being forced to collaborate on region-wide issues, including population distribution by income and race. From efforts at absolute exclusion of the poor, and consequently, most blacks, attention is being given to how to spread the "problem" of the poor around. The extent to which the moderate cost suburbs, particularly those that are older and closer to the center city, realize that the continued viability of their community is dependent on stable transition from an aging population to one which could include blacks as well as whites is the extent to which blacks will be less concentrated in central cities than they now are.. However, there is limited evidence that old suburbs are thinking along these lines and many are trying to stop all growth or change. Overall, the pattern in suburbia is not encouraging, despite the potential of more dispersed settlement as part of a rational and comprehensive growth and development policy.



## ENDNOTES

1

For a discussion of income trends, see Ann Horowitz, "Trends in the Distribution of Family Income Within and Between Racial Groups," in George von Furstenburg, Ann Horowitz and Bennett Harrison (eds.) Patterns of Racial Discrimination, Vol. II. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 202-3. Ms. Horowitz found that there was no real increase in racial equality in terms of family income through 1972, except in the South.

2

U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, #42, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1972. Table 2.

3

Ibid., U.S. Bureau of Census, 1973, Table 4, and 1974, Table 5.

4

The 26 cities are: New York, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Houston, Cleveland, New Orleans, Atlanta, St. Louis, Memphis, Dallas, Newark, Indianapolis, Birmingham, Cincinnati, Oakland, Jacksonville, Kansas City (Mo.), Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Richmond, Boston, Columbus (Ohio).

5

U.S. Bureau of Census, loc.cit., 1973, Table 4.

6

The Annual Housing Survey (1973) shows that among recent movers (almost all white), there was a net outmigration from metropolitan areas to non-metropolitan areas of 3.5%. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series H-150-73D, Housing Characteristics of Recent Movers for the United States and Regions. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. xvii. Also see, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 262, March 1974, and No. 273, December, 1974.

7

For a discussion of this trend see, generally, David Birch, The Economic Future of the City and the Suburb, (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1970). Also see Ernest Erber, "The Inner City in the Post-Industrial Era: A Study of its Changing Social Fabric and Economic Function," in Declan Kennedy and Margrit Kennedy (eds.) The Inner City, (New York: Halstead Press, 1974).

8

See Reilly Atkinson, "Housing Deprivation", Integrated Education, 13:3 (May-June, 1975), p. 85. As used here, "deprivation" refers to a host of problems including structural deficiencies, overcrowding, or excessive rent burden.



9

Norman M. Bradburn, Seymour Sudman and Galen L. Gockel, Racial Integration in American Neighborhoods: A Comparative Survey. (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1970). "When the most important housing advantages of whites are compared to those most important for negroes, it becomes apparent that both races base their housing choices on substantially the same criteria." p. 262.

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Peter H. Rossi, Why Families Move: A Study in the Social Psychology of Urban Residential Mobility. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

11

Bradburn, loc.cit. Table 9.8.

12

U.S. Bureau of Census, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974, Table 9.

13

Ibid., 1972, Table 37.

14

Ibid. 1970, Table 17.

15

Ibid. 1972, Table 61.

16

Ibid. 1972, Table 60.

17

Ibid., 1972, Tables 65 and 66.

18

Arthur I. Hermalin and Reynolds Farley, "The Potential for Residential Integration in Cities and Suburbs: Implications for the Busing Controversy," American Sociological Review, 1973, Vol. 38 (Oct.). pp. 595-610.

19

Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965).

20

Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, Racial Attitudes in 15 American Cities. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1968). Tables IIa and IIb.



21

Quoted in Rose Helper, Racial Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969). p. 201. At that time, the name of NAR was the National Association of Real Estate Boards.

22

U.S. Bureau of Census, loc.cit., 1973, Table 7.

23

Ibid., 1974, Table 11.

24

Ibid., 1974, Table 31, and 1972, Table 27.

25

Juliet Z. Saltman, Open Housing as a Social Movement: Challenge, Conflict And Change. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971).

26

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Understanding Fair Housing (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

27

Mark Battle Associates, Inc. with the assistance of National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Techniques. (Washington, D.C.: Mark Battle Associates, Inc., 1975). Final Project Report presented to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. (Not released as of February, 1976).

28

Ernest Erber and John P. Prior, Housing Allocation Planning: An Annotated Bibliography. (Monticello, Ill.: Council of Planning Librarians Exchange Bibliography, March 1974). #547.

29

Agreement to obey the law can be considered as progress only when measured against past performance. For an appraisal of the shortcomings of this and other voluntary marketing agreements, see Robert C. Weaver's testimony before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights chaired by Rep. Don Edwards (D-Cal.), March 9, 1976.

30

Martin E. Sloane and the legal staff of NCDH (National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing), Fair Housing and Exclusionary Land Use (Washington, D.C.: NCDH and the Urban Land Institute, 1974).

31

Herbert M. Franklin, David Falk, and Arthur J. Levin. In-Zoning: A Guide for Policy-Makers on Inclusionary Land Use Programs. (Washington, D.C.: The Potomac Institute, 1974).



32

See Joseph Zikmund, III, "Sources of Suburban Population: 1955-60 and 1965-70," a paper prepared for the Conference on the Suburban Reshaping of American Politics, Temple University, April, 1970.

33

For an up-to-date discussion of trends in cost of homeownership in both new and existing housing, see generally Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Housing Goals and Mortgage Credit: 1975-80 held at Washington, September 22-25, 1975. See especially the paper by Henry Schecter, pp. 154-92.

34

For a discussion of the problem of poor in low-density suburban areas, see Organization for Scientific and Technical Innovation and Llwyn-Davies Associates, Poverty in Spread City, 1969.

35

For an example of one older suburb of this type see, Arthur D. Little, Inc. East Cleveland: Response to Urban Change (Cambridge: A.D. Little, 1969).

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See Solomon and Sara Sutker (eds.) Racial Transition in the Inner Suburbs: Studies of the St. Louis Area (New York: Praeger Publ., 1974).



Table 1

## POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE METROPOLITAN AREAS:

1960 and 1970

*(numbers in thousands)*

Area	Black		White	
	1960	1970	1960	1970
United States .....	18,872	22,580	158,832	177,749
Metropolitan areas.....	12,741	16,771	105,829	120,579
Inside central cities .....	9,874	13,140	49,415	49,430
Outside central cities.....	2,866	3,630	56,414	71,148
Nonmetropolitan areas.....	6,131	5,810	53,003	57,170
Percent Distribution				
United States .....	100	100	100	100
Metropolitan areas.....	68	74	67	68
Inside central cities.....	52	58	31	28
Outside central cities.....	15	16	36	40
Nonmetropolitan areas.....	32	26	33	32

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974, Table 4.



Table 2

BLACK MIGRATION TO SUBURBS  
IN 20 METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1960-1970

<u>SMSA</u>	% Change Suburban Whites: 1960-70	# of Black Migrants to Suburbs: 1960-70	Black Suburban Population: 1970	% Change, Black Su- burban Population: 1960-70	% Black in Suburbs:	
					1960	1970
New York	23.8	76,962	216,656	66.1	4.8	5.0
Los Angeles	14.4	123,148	240,247	105.2	3.6	6.2
Chicago	33.9	50,782	128,299	65.5	2.9	3.6
Philadelphia	21.5	48,445	190,509	34.1	6.1	6.6
Detroit	28.2	20,008	96,655	26.1	3.7	3.6
San Francisco	28.1	41,307	109,319	60.7	4.4	5.4
Washington	58.0	82,287	166,033	98.3	6.4	7.9
Boston	10.6	7,701	22,328	52.6	.8	1.1
Pittsburgh	4.2a	4,173	64,980	6.9	3.4	3.4
St. Louis	26.6	43,586	124,625	53.8	6.0	7.2
Baltimore	35.7	9,608	70,014	15.9	7.0	6.0
Cleveland	23.4	36,674	44,773	452.8b	.9	3.4
Houston	63.3	4,803	66,815	7.7	12.9	8.9
Newark	10.8	54,835	140,884	63.7	6.7	9.6
Minneapolis	55.4	1,506	2,183	222.5	.1	.2
Dallas	66.1	1,766	38,324	4.8	8.3	5.2
Seattle	62.9	2,220	3,361	194.6	.2	.4
Anahim (Cal.)	132.5	1,786	3,116	134.6	.3	.3
Milwaukee	27.3	715	1,444	98.1	.1	.2
Atlanta	72.5	10,606	55,616	23.6	8.5	6.2

a Pittsburgh had substantial annexation during the decade, 1960-70.

b Accounted for almost entirely by ghetto "spillover" to East Cleveland.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, Census of Population:  
1970 (PHC(2)-1.



Table 3: Voting Age Population and Method of Election

City and state	Election by		Total voting age population	Percent black <sup>a</sup>
	Popular Vote	Council Vote	Number	
Prichard, Ala	X		24,549	46
Berkeley, Cal.	X		93,022	20
Compton, Cal.	X		42,517	65
Los Angeles, Cal.	X		1,966,855	16
Boulder, Colo.	X		48,433	*
Gainesville, Fla.			49,423	14
Atlanta, Ga.	X		337,438	46
East St. Louis, Ill.	X		41,848	63
Gary, Ind.	X		107,425	48
College Park, Md.	X		20,293	3
Detroit, Mich.	X		1,017,608	37
Grand Rapids, Mich.	X		130,727	9
Highland Park, Mich.	X		23,897	46
Inkster, Mich.	X		22,538	44
Pontiac, Mich.		X	53,472	23
Ypsilanti, Mich.	X		23,567	16
East Orange, N. J.	X		55,898	46
New Brunswick, N.J.	X		31,515	17
Newark, N.J.	X		240,033	48
Chapel Hill, N.C.	X		20,157	8
Raleigh, N.C.	X		88,857	20
Cincinnati, Ohio		X	312,055	24
Dayton, Ohio	X		166,849	27
Waco, Texas		X	66,850	17
Charlottesville, Va.		X	28,009	13
Washington, D. C.	X		532,404	64

\*Less than one percent.

<sup>a</sup>

Calculations based on data taken from U.S. Census of Population, 1970.

Source: Herrington J. Bryce



4  
Table 1: Form of Government

City/State	Percent Black	Form of Government			
		Mayor-Council	Commission	Council-Manager	
Birmingham, Alabama	42%	X			
Mobile, Alabama	35%		X		
Montgomery, Alabama	33%		X		
Pine Bluff, Arkansas	41%	X			
Oakland, California	35%			X	
Wilmington, Delaware	44%	X			
Albany, Georgia	38%			X	
Augusta, Georgia	50%	X			
Macon, Georgia	37%	X			
Savannah, Georgia	45%			X	
Monroe, Louisiana	38%		X		
New Orleans, Louisiana	45%	X			
Shreveport, Louisiana	39%		X		
Baltimore, Maryland	46%	X			
Jackson Mississippi	40%		X		
St. Louis, Missouri	41%	X			
Camden, New Jersey	39%	X			
Trenton, New Jersey	38%	X			
Durham, North Carolina	39%			X	
Fayetteville, North Carolina	38%			X	
Winston-Salem, North Carolina	34%			X	
Cleveland, Ohio	38%	X			
Chester, Pennsylvania	45%	X			
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	34%	X			



3.

11